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REMOTE SENSING OF PRIVATE DATA BY DRONES IS
MOSTLY UNREGULATED: REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
OF PRIVACY ARE AT RISK ABSENT COMPREHENSIVE
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
JOSEPH J. VACEK, J.D., CFI*

ABSTRACT
The current regulatory structure governing the use of small drones by
government and citizens is not yet fully settled, but enough parameters exist
in the form of existing and proposed regulations, statutes, and case law that
the answer to the question of whether police and private citizens may use
small drones to remotely sense or record other people’s activities is
generally yes, subject to a few limitations. The next set of questions that
arise pertain to the methods of collection, use, retention, and dissemination
of that remotely sensed data. The current legal landscape in the United
States relevant to that set of questions includes common law principles
based in tort, the Third-Party Doctrine, federal data protection statutes such
as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Privacy Act,
Unmanned Aircraft System-specific laws, policies and regulations such as
the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act, the newly proposed Federal Aviation
Regulations for small UAS, and a Presidential Memorandum on privacy
issues related to drone use. Those laws, regulations, and policies, both
individually and together, are ineffective in protecting remotely sensed
private data. Because states are federally preempted from regulating
aviation, a comprehensive federal legislative enactment delineating specific
limitations on the gathering of private data via drones is necessary to
prevent erosion of our collective reasonable expectations of privacy.

* Joe Vacek is a tenured associate professor at the University of North Dakota School of
Aerospace Sciences. He teaches aviation and space law, transportation, environmental policy, and
aviation technical classes at the undergraduate, honors, and graduate levels. Vacek’s primary
research area is the law of remote sensing, both international and domestic; he focuses specifically
on Fourth Amendment search and seizure, privacy, and civil issues related to manned and
unmanned aircraft systems and space-based systems. He holds commercial pilot and certified
flight instructor certificates, is a practicing lawyer and mediator, and is a former Peace Corps
volunteer. He is also the faculty advisor for the UND competition aerobatic flying team. Outside
of academia, Vacek enjoys endurance sports, having recently completed an Ironman triathlon,
swum a marathon, and ridden his bicycle across the United States. He commutes by bicycle year
round in his hometown of Grand Forks, North Dakota.
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INTRODUCTION

The flight of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”), or Drones, in the
national airspace has become an ordinary, unremarkable event. Neither the
technology for remotely controlled or even autonomous flight nor the
aerodynamics of fixed wing or helicopter-type drones are new, having been
developed and operational in various forms since World War II. Since that
time, a cottage industry of remote-controlled aircraft enthusiasts and
hobbyists has existed, mostly for the pleasure of constructing and flying
scale-model aircraft at local parks. Remote sensing technology in the
United States developed along a similar timeline, with World War II and
the Cold War prompting research and development of relatively lightweight
and small airborne cameras and sensing equipment, which also spurred
development of a cottage industry of amateur photo and video enthusiasts.
Together, these ingredients now provide cheap airborne imaging
equipment available to the general public in the United States. Currently,
amateur civilian drone operators may remotely sense persons and property
practically without limitation. Commercial drone operators have obtained
special permission and are eagerly awaiting the publication of proposed
rules allowing widespread use of drones for remote sensing. And existing
precedent allows warrantless airborne remote sensing by police of private
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areas in open view from a legal altitude1 using technology in general public
use2 as long as the remote sensing does not penetrate into a home.3 The
common law and the proposed rules will likely follow suit, and operating a
drone to photograph people from above in a manner that complies with
applicable federal aviation regulations will probably not give rise to a civil
suit for invasion of privacy or trespass. Operation of the drone itself is only
the first step, however. The remote sensing, use, and storage of the data are
all open questions under current laws, and protection of that data is
problematic because of a fragmentary legal structure.
This article will examine in detail the existing legal structure governing
airborne remote sensing by drone in three sections. First, it will canvas
applicable principles of common law and existing federal regulations and
statutes.
Second, it will explore constitutional issues pertinent to
government and police remote sensing using drones. Third, it will move to
an analysis of current civil use and misuse of drones by the general public.
It concludes by arguing that the existing data protection laws in the United
States are wholly inadequate to protect citizens’ remotely sensed data from
unauthorized government or private use. In combination with the
widespread availability of small, inexpensive, and automated drones and the
widely acknowledged inability of the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) to enforce its rules, the implication is that the citizens have
nullified the existing rules and laws, such that a significant reduction in
subjective and objective reasonable expectations of privacy is inevitable.
II. LAWS REGULATING REMOTE SENSING BY DRONES
The various laws regulating remote sensing by drones developed
independently in two different areas of law. The first area is under the
framework of tort law, from which the general right of privacy developed in
the common law.
The second area is under international treaty.
Specifically, Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
from 1944 (the Chicago Treaty) stipulates that “[n]o aircraft capable of
being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory
of a contracting state without special authorization by that state and in
accordance with the terms of such authorization . . . .”4
1 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
2 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
3 Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He?, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673,
680 (2009).
4. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.

2014]

REMOTE SENSING OF PRIVATE DATA BY DRONES

467

Tort law has traditionally defined the right of privacy as the right of a
person to be free from intrusion upon seclusion, from being shown in a
false light, from private information being publicly disclosed, and from
misappropriation of his or her likeness.5 Of course, a person may elect to
disclose ordinarily personal or private things in a public forum, such as by
posting a revealing Facebook status update or by uploading a compromising
photo on Flickr or Pinterest. This behavior is a license for public
observation and analogous to the principle that a bell cannot be unrung.
Such actions led to the development of the Third-Party Doctrine, which will
be explored further later. Overall, though, the common law does not keep
pace with technological developments as evidenced by legislators filling
gaps with statutory law. But the sensing of private data by drone is a
unique case that allows access around many of the barriers erected by the
common law and statutory protections, which thus requires singular
consideration.
A. FEW LEGAL PRINCIPLES PROTECT REMOTELY SENSED PRIVATE
DATA
The legal right to keep certain things private has been imported by the
English common law in cases dating back to the early 1800s,6 specifically
for issues concerning intellectual property7 and photographic images.8
American common law has also adopted these principles with the
development of tort law in the areas of nuisance, invasion of privacy, and
trespass, especially. “The common law secures to each individual the right
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.”9 And that right, in all cases,
belongs solely to the individual in terms of whether or how to grant it to the
public.10 The justification for that right, however, has traditionally been
illustrated using the physical process of letter writing and the securing of
that single copy of the letter in a locked desk or sealed in an envelope and
placed in the mail for delivery. The utility of that analogy arguably has
ended with the advent of electronic communications, practically infinite
storage and retrieval capability, and airborne remote sensors mounted on

5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (1825).
7. Id.
8. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198
(1890).
10. Id.
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drones. So torts grounded in that theory have only tenuous applicability to
privacy invasions or remote sensing via drone.
1. Common Law Principles of Nuisance, Trespass, and Invasion
of Privacy Give Limited Protection from Airborne Remote
Sensing
Common law recognizes several actions in tort that are designed to
allow an individual to maintain a privacy wall—literal and metaphorical—
between what he or she wishes to keep private and others whose curiosity
compels them to snoop. However, physical walls or written letters sealed in
paper envelopes bear little relevance to data collection by drone. The three
classic tort actions relevant to airborne snooping are the torts of nuisance,
trespass, and invasion of privacy. Nuisance is the oldest and broadest of the
three and developed in accordance with the legal theory that not only should
injuries to the person be compensable, but also injuries to a person’s
property.11 The law of nuisance produced the concept of zoning as a
preemptive rule to avoid continuous litigation, and the current system of
airspace classification in the United States follows similar principles of
“zoning” where certain kinds of operations are prohibited in certain classes
of airspace. But aside from that nice analogy, the law of nuisance has been
described as an “impenetrable jungle . . . [meaning] all things to all people,
and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.”12
Unfortunately, then, in the context of drone operations, there probably
exists a set of facts that, when applied creatively to the theory of nuisance,
may give rise to injunction or damages against the drone operator. But the
way there is not clear.
Trespass, the second classic tort relevant to drone operations, is much
more clearly defined in the common law and is bifurcated into trespass to
land and trespass to chattels. Trespass to land is defined as a “wrongful
interference with another’s possessory rights in real property.”13 Possessory
rights in real property extend upwards into the airspace to the highest level
the possessor can reasonably use14—providing a potential cause of action
11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
12. WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86, 616 (5th ed.
1984).
13. See, e.g., Robert’s River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 301
(Iowa 1994).
14. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (“It is ancient doctrine that at
common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.”).
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against drone operators intruding into superadjacent airspace above a
plaintiff’s land. Much remote sensing equipment is powerful enough,
though, to allow an airborne snoop to fly above such superadjacent airspace
and avoid a trespass claim.
The other trespass action—trespass to chattels—may possibly provide
limited relief. Trespass to chattels has been defined as “an intentional
interference with the possession of personal property . . . proximately
caus[ing] injury.”15 If the drone operator remotely senses something that
could be objectively defined as personal property, a cause of action may
arise. A simple example of that could be a photograph taken by drone of a
sunbathing person when the person has taken precautions to install a
privacy fence to prevent such photography. A more sophisticated example
could be the use of a drone programmed to follow a person, remotely
sensing that person’s location and activities at various times throughout the
day, correlating that data with location information, and the subsequent
selling of that information to commercial entities for marketing purposes.
Following CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,16 the tort of trespass
to land could be used to enjoin the kind of remote sensing that could be
described as robot paparazzi. Of course, physically being in public weighs
against civil privacy rights, but the law recognizes a distinction between
privacy rights of public figures versus those of ordinary citizens,17 and that
distinction would appear to apply here as well.
Finally, the relatively new tort action of invasion of privacy may
provide a potential cause of action in the context of snooping drones.18 The
right to privacy arises under the traditional civil tort action of intrusion
upon seclusion.19 While state court rulings vary under this theory, the tort
is generally viewed to have originated from a Harvard Law Review article
authored by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890. Cognizant that
technology would develop faster than the law, they foreshadowed the need
for legal protection from prying eyes: “[N]ow that modern devices afford
abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any
participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the law must be
placed upon a broader foundation.”20 Brandeis and Warren clearly foresaw
15. Thrifty-Tel, Inc., v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996).
16. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Here the court applied the principles of trespass to
chattels to support its holding enjoining unsolicited bulk e-mail from being sent. Id. at 1021.
17. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (“The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small that such discussion
[regarding public figures] must be privileged.”).
18. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2003).
19. See id.
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 210-21.
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the potential erosion of personal privacy in the face of technologically
assisted prying eyes and ears and advocated for the creation of a specific
right to privacy, constructing their theory from the areas of intentional torts
against the person, nuisance, and intellectual property. 21 From those, the
argument follows that “the principle which protects personal writings and
any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to
privacy . . . .”22 Legal scholar William Prosser elaborated upon the
foundations of Brandeis and Warren in a law review article in 196023 where
he argued that the right to privacy had been legally established in four
separate but related areas: intrusion, public disclosure, false light, and
appropriation. Prosser noted that cases showed these related legal
principles “have been supported by genuine public demand and lively
public feeling, and made necessary by real abuses on the part of defendants
who have brought it all upon themselves.”24 Similar public demand, lively
debate, and the potential for abuse point towards the continued relevance of
expanding the privacy torts to remotely sensed private data.
2. The Third-Party Doctrine Precludes Meaningful Control Over
Most Remotely Sensed Private Data
The Third-Party Doctrine is a legal theory relevant to remotely sensed
private data used by government agencies or police. While it has not been
applied to private parties involved in a tort action,25 the doctrine’s
underpinnings closely parallel the civil right to privacy discussed earlier.
The Third-Party Doctrine from Smith v. Maryland26 essentially holds that
individuals who disclose private information to third parties have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in that disclosed data.27 Smith is the “pen
register” case where the Supreme Court held that while the contents of the
conversation may be protected, the information voluntarily provided to a
third party, the numbers dialed by the defendant, was not.28 Congress
responded with the Pen Register Act, which requires a search warrant for
obtaining evidence via pen register.29
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
matters.
(1976).
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 213.
Id.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
Id. at 423.
The current cases that comprise the “third-party doctrine” all arise from criminal
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 774.
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2006).
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But aside from pen register situations, commentators30 have
demonstrated that the protections individuals have in their private data is
quite limited and inconsistent—that “information that has been exposed to
middlemen, from medical and financial data to our reading habits”31 is
without Fourth Amendment protection. In fact, the Court has constructed a
special category of information described as “transactional” data32—which
is essentially metadata33—the “outsides” of data packets. This metadata is
literally the outside of a physical envelope or the numbers dialed on a phone
or the GPS coordinates from which protected data is transmitted. The
problem is that the metadata is sometimes as rich, or even richer, in content
than the constitutionally protected data it describes,34 which can be
incredibly valuable as evidence. Harvesting metadata is relatively simple; a
small drone equipped with an appropriately tuned radio frequency scanner35
can select and record all transmissions within line-of-sight. And the “sight
radius” of a small drone operating at a few hundred feet is several orders of
magnitude larger than a ground-based unit.
The Sixth Circuit bolstered the Third-Party Doctrine in the context of
remote sensing by drone in United States v. Skinner.36 In Skinner, the court
held that warrantless tracking of the defendant by use of his mobile phone
location data was not unreasonable because he had no “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data given off” by his phone.37 That case
appears to clear the way for metadata harvesting by drone, although various
federal statutes and regulations may still protect the content of a wirelessly
transmitted communication.

30. See, e.g., Jay Stanley, The Crisis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y (2010), https://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20%20Stanley%204th%20
Amendment.pdf.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Metadata is data that describes other data, which includes structural information and
descriptive information.
34. An example of rich metadata could be the GPS coordinates from where a series of
cryptic text messages were sent and received, followed by the GPS location of where the
transmitting device (and suspect) then traveled.
35. An example of such a device is a Cellebrite Universal Forensic Extraction Device,
which, among other capabilities, can harvest and record data transmissions from cellular devices
and smartphones.
36. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
37. Id. at 777.
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B. FEDERAL STATUTES AND AVIATION REGULATIONS GENERALLY
PERMIT REMOTE SENSING
There are a few federal statutes that may potentially regulate remotely
sensed data by drone, and several existing and proposed Federal Aviation
Regulations (“FARs”) directly apply to drone operations, but together they
provide little protection from, control over, or remedy for abuse of remotely
sensed data by drone. The relevant federal statutes are the Wiretap Act,38
the Stored Communications Act,39 and the Pen Register Act,40 which are all
part of the Electronic Communications Protections Act (“ECPA”).41 The
applicable FARs include operating rules from 14 CFR 91 and the proposed
regulations to be numbered 14 CFR 107.42
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Allows
Practically Unfettered Data Gathering Via Drone
While the ECPA generally prohibits the interception and use of the
contents of electronic communications,43 the potentially evidence-rich
metadata that describes those communications and is used to identify, sort,
store, and deliver the communication via the internet has virtually no
protection. “Electronic communications means any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce . . . .”44 As the discussion of the Third-Party Doctrine above45
indicates, drones make ideal platforms for remotely sensing data
transmitted wirelessly, as well as for direct sensing of the ground or
subjects below via optical camera or otherwise. Interception of a wirelessly
transmitted signal would clearly fall under the definition of “electronic
communications” for the purposes of the ECPA, as would a number of
other kinds of airborne interceptions. However, there are four exceptions
under the ECPA for wire or oral communications, communications made by
pager devices (tone-only), communications from tracking devices, and

38. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
42. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a)-(e) (2006).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
45. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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electronic funds transfer information.46 In the drone context, remote
sensing of location via tracking devices is probably most relevant. A
tracking device is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”47 Because
sensing location information is thusly exempted from protection under the
ECPA, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened that notion in
Skinner to all emanated data, the ECPA itself appears to give very little
protection to remotely sensed location data or metadata.
The Wiretap Act,48 part of the ECPA, prohibits governmental
interception of in-transit communications without a search warrant. The
key here is that the communications or data must actually be in transit.49
But aside from voice calls, most electronic communications and data are
actually stationary, stored in a server awaiting transmission or another
server awaiting retrieval by the recipient versus moving along the
network.50 Thus, it is a very simple thing to avoid violating the Wiretap
Act; all authorities must do is avoid intercepting communications or data
while it is moving. So, while operation of a drone equipped with a packet
analyzer program51 by a private party or a government actor without a
search warrant would violate the Wiretap Act, it does nothing to narrow the
large “emanated data” loophole discussed earlier.
Finally, the Stored Communications Act52 governs electronic
communications not in transit—those stored on a computer server. It was
enacted to prevent unlawful or unauthorized disclosures of electronic
communication while in electronic storage by third-party providers.53
While at first glance this seems to be a restriction on the Third-Party
Doctrine that protects data from snooping when it is not in transit (which is
most of the time), it still only protects the “physical contents” of the data,
not the metadata. For example, an email’s message would be protected
when stored on a server, but not the to/from headers, which are considered
to be “outside the envelope” and thus would fall under the purview of the
Wiretap Act. Additionally, there is uncertainty as to the status of old,
archived communications, such as archived email, which may have less
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
49. Id.
50. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981-82 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
51. A packet analyzer is a computer program that can intercept and record data traveling
through a network. As data moves through the network, the analyzer can capture a packet, decode
the packet’s raw data, including metadata, and analyze its content.
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
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protection under the Stored Communication Act.54 For a drone that has
been assigned a mission to orbit and “listen” for metadata and location
information being emanated or transmitted wirelessly, none of the parts of
the ECPA just described would protect that metadata or location
information.
2. Current and Proposed Federal Aviation Regulations
Generally Allow Remote Sensing by Drones
The FAA currently prohibits the commercial use of small drones
without special prior authorization,55 but that prohibition has been
challenged in at least one case56 and is widely viewed as ineffective.57
Current federal aviation regulations are silent regarding drones or
unmanned aircraft, but the Agency has recently proposed a new section to
the federal aviation regulations specific to small drone operations.58 Those
newly proposed regulations would apply only to commercial operations,
however, leaving civilian amateur enthusiasts and hobbyists as they
currently are, which is essentially free to use their small crafts for remote
sensing so long as they follow the guidelines for amateur model aircraft
operators,59 and such guidelines are generally limited to avoiding flying
over crowds of people or otherwise endangering them and avoiding airports
and aircraft operations. Those amateur-operator guidelines are silent as to
whether or not a model aircraft may be equipped with a camera or other
remote-sensing equipment.
Governmental entities currently may operate a small drone equipped
with a remote sensor by way of obtaining a Certificate of Authorization
(“COA”), which is a regulatory waiver that allows relatively limited, noncommercial operations.60 More discussion of regulatory and other
limitations on government use of drones follows later. However, in both
54. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
55. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01:
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN U.S. NAT’L AIRSPACE SYSTEM 4 (Mar. 13,
2008),
available
at
http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/ato/service
units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/faq/media/uasguidance08-01.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 18,
2014).
57. Jack Nicas & Andy Pasztor, FAA, Drones Clash on Rules for Unmanned Aircraft, WALL
ST. J., May 11, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579
556144292258188.
58. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45).
59. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Advisory Circular 91-57 (June 9, 1981), available at
http://www faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/advisorycircular/91-57.pdf.
60. INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01, supra note 55, at 4.
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the proposed regulations and in FAA’s policy document “Integration of
Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”) in the National Airspace
(“NAS”) Roadmap,”61 the general issue of privacy related to remote sensing
by drone is raised multiple times, but no enforceable regulatory guidance or
prohibitions are provided.
3. The Privacy Act and a Presidential Memorandum Provide
Some Limitations on Federal Agencies for the Collection,
Retention, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data
The Privacy Act of 1974 and a Presidential Memorandum remain the
last potential legal and policy protections against widespread airborne
remote sensing of private data. The Privacy Act62 regulates federal
governmental agency collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
personally identifiable information about individuals63 unless one or more
of twelve exceptions applies.64 The exceptions appear to render the Privacy
Act relatively toothless for protecting remotely sensed data. Two
significant exceptions that serve as examples in the context of drone remote
sensing are the exception for law enforcement purposes65 and the exception
for consumer reporting agencies.66 It appears that data gathered by airborne
remote sensing would be treated the same way as any other information
subject to the Privacy Act, regardless of the fact that airborne remote
sensing facilitates data gathering orders of much greater magnitude than the
less sophisticated methods in place when the statute was drafted in 1974.
A Presidential Memorandum titled “Promoting Economic
Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems”67 was published
concurrently with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the proposed
federal aviation regulations governing the operation of small drones. A
Presidential Memorandum is very similar to an executive order, neither of
which has a basis for existence in the Constitution and both of which are a
form of executive legislation and have the full force of law if made pursuant
61. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
(UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE (NAS) ROADMAP (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/
uas/media/uasroadmap2013.pdf.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/
presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua.
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to a congressional act that delegates some power to the executive. Here, the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 201268 is the required
congressional act, which contains a directive to the Secretary of
Transportation (an executive appointee) to develop a plan to safely integrate
UAS into the national airspace.69 Therefore, the Memorandum appears to
be a legally binding instrument that orders federal agencies to take into
account “privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties”70 concerns related to the
operations of drones.
Specifically, the Memorandum establishes guidelines for federal
agencies in addition to already existing laws, such as the Privacy Act, to
promulgate policies and procedures for protecting privacy, protecting civil
rights and civil liberties, accountability, transparency, and reporting.71 For
protection of privacy, “agencies shall, prior to deployment of new UAS
technology and at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies
and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination
of information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties are protected.”72 A time limit for retention of collected
information is set at 180 days, unless longer times are necessary or
required.73
For protection of civil rights and civil liberties, the
Memorandum reminds agencies to put in place policies to prohibit violating
the First Amendment or other parts of the Constitution.74
For
accountability, the Memorandum requires agencies to establish policies
addressing audits, subcontractors, oversight, asset sharing, data use and
sharing, and grant funding matters.75 For transparency, the Memorandum
requires agencies inform the public about UAS missions, location, and an
annual summary of operations including a brief description and number of
operations, but only to the extent such information would not reveal
compromising law enforcement or security information.76 Finally, each
agency must provide status reports to the President and public instructions
for accessing the policies and procedures implemented by the
Memorandum.77

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11.
Id.
See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 67, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
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III. GOVERNMENT VERSUS CIVIL USE OF DRONES
The use of remote sensing technology by the government or police
against citizens in the United States has traditionally been limited by the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.78 Such use by police to
surveil citizens led to cases questioning the extent to which the government
could use remote sensing equipment to monitor citizens. The most famous
of those cases is Katz v. United States,79 where the government used a
remote sensing device—a microphone—to listen to a private conversation
occurring in a public telephone booth without a search warrant.80 In
deciding whether such remote sensing activities were appropriate to use
against citizens in public places, the Court focused on the overarching
Constitutional principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places”81 and treated the technological surveillance methods as secondary.
Under Katz, regardless of the location or remote sensing method, private
data from a conversation is protected from unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a reasonable expectation of
privacy.82
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINS GOVERNMENTAL
REMOTE SENSING BY DRONE
The Fourth Amendment states “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”83 In the context of airborne remote sensing, a number of Supreme
Court decisions exist that are directly on point. In those cases, the aircraft
has been a manned, piloted aircraft, but the distinction is irrelevant for the
sensing function of the platform.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 353.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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1. Airborne Warrantless Remote Sensing from a Legal Altitude Is
Generally Not a Violation of the Fourth Amendment
Airborne warrantless searches are generally equivalent to an “open
fields”84 search and are usually constitutional if they are of an “area in open
view from any legal altitude . . . as long as the technology used to obtain the
surveillance is in general public use and does not penetrate into the
home.”85 That principle is distilled from four Supreme Court decisions.
Three of those—California v. Ciraolo,86 Florida v. Riley,87 and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States88—are pertinent to the “airborne” part. In
Ciraolo, police used a small fixed-wing aircraft to observe the defendant’s
fenced backyard from 1000 feet.89 In Riley, police used a helicopter to
observe the interior of the defendant’s enclosed greenhouse from a much
lower altitude.90 In Dow Chemical, an agency used a fixed-wing aircraft to
photograph the corporation’s secure facility from above.91 In all the cases,
no search warrant was obtained and the Court found no Fourth Amendment
violation. The fourth case sets the bar for the remote sensing part.
About a decade later, the Supreme Court limited the extent police could
use sophisticated remote sensing equipment without a search warrant. In
Kyllo v. United States, police used a thermal imaging device to infer the
internal temperature of the defendant’s home by observing the infrared
signature emitted by the house.92 The Court held that such penetrating
remote sensing searches are unconstitutional without a search warrant,93
which appears to limit technological erosion of privacy. Additionally, the
Court tied part of its reasoning to the availability of the technology to the
general public.94
Although at the time of the decision thermal imaging devices were
quite expensive and not widely available, they have become relatively
commonplace now. A more troubling issue is that thermal remote sensing
is not a “penetrating” search at all,95 and much more recent cases indicate
84. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
85. Vacek, supra note 3, at 683-84 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001)).
86. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
87. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
88. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
89. 476 U.S. at 209.
90. 488 U.S. at 450.
91. 476 U.S. at 229.
92. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
93. Id. at 40.
94. Id. at 34.
95. Id. at 40. The technology at issue in Kyllo had nothing to do with penetration of a home,
such as the justices perhaps imagined akin to x-ray glasses. Instead, the remote sensing equipment
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that any emanations of data—be it thermal, electromagnetic, sound, or
other—are not protected.
2. Persistent, Penetrating, or Technologically Sophisticated
Remote Sensing Probably Requires a Search Warrant
Airborne warrantless searches are generally held to be equivalent to an
“open fields” search and are usually constitutional if they are of an “area in
open view from any legal altitude . . . as long as the technology used to
obtain the surveillance is in general public use and does not penetrate into
the home.”96 The original Katz postulation that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places”97 applied to the United States v. Jones allusions
to search duration98 and to several notable cases involving searches by
sophisticated remote sensing technology, and it leads to the argument that
persistent, penetrating, or technologically sophisticated remote sensing
probably requires a search warrant.
In United States v. Jones,99 the Supreme Court decided that “the
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use
of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’”
under the Fourth Amendment.100 Much of the opinion focused narrowly on
the issue of physical trespass to the defendant’s vehicle.101 Although the
theme of time or search duration appeared no less than seventeen times
throughout the opinion and concurrences, the Court maintained that its
holding did not concern whether the search or the duration of the search
was reasonable because the sole question was binary: whether or not a
search had occurred. That left open the question of whether similar “remote
sensing-type” warrantless searches would be reasonable absent a physical
trespass. After the Jones decision in 2012, several cases related to remote
sensing have been decided that bear on the issue of warrantless remote
sensing searches.

employed by law enforcement simply sensed a normally invisible part of the electromagnetic
spectrum—infrared light, which is just slightly “longer” than red light—imperceptible to human
vision. Although shorter wavelengths of electromagnetic energy, such as the type used in x-ray
imaging, actually can penetrate obstructions to vision, the Kyllo case appears to have had the
physics of electromagnetic imaging exactly backwards.
96. Vacek, supra note 3, at 683.
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
98. 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). References to search duration or time occurred seventeen times
throughout the opinion.
99. Id. at 949.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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In United States v. Skinner,102 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that warrantless tracking of the defendant by use of his mobile phone
location data was not unreasonable because he had “no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data given off” by his phone.103 The duration
of the data collection was three days, which the court noted was not
“extreme comprehensive tracking,” unlike the four weeks of tracking in
Jones.104 Also of note was the court’s reliance on the lack of “physical
intrusion” in its analysis of whether governmental monitoring of the
defendant’s broadcast data violated the Fourth Amendment and the court’s
finding that “[u]sing a more efficient means of discovering [defendant’s
location] does not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.”105
Finally, in Florida v. Jardines,106 the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless search of defendant’s front porch by use of a drug-sniffing dog
violated the Fourth Amendment, and a search warrant was required.107
Throughout the opinion, the Court analogized to remote sensing devices in
constructing its holding, referring to thermal imaging devices (like those
used in Kyllo) and high-powered binoculars.108 From these recent cases, it
appears that the courts are shifting in their analyses of warrantless searching
from an outdated focus on physical limitations to an approach more
appropriate to the reality of the age of wireless data and unmanned aircraft.
Read together, these cases appear to indicate that the longer the
duration of a surveillance situation (especially via drone), the more
traditionally “private” the object of surveillance (such as the curtilage or the
home), and the more technologically invasive the surveillance methods, the
more likely courts will require a search warrant. In the long view, it may be
best to follow Justice Potter’s observation from his concurrence in Katz: the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”109 His wisdom could be
applied in a data or information context; the Fourth Amendment should
protect information, not the place where it is found.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 779.
133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).
Id. at 1417-18.
Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

2014]

REMOTE SENSING OF PRIVATE DATA BY DRONES

481

B. THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO CONSTRAINTS ON CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING BY DRONE
Capable, small drones are ubiquitous in the marketplace today, and
amateur operators and commercial outfits have taken advantage of their
remote sensing capabilities and low prices, such that small drone activities
in the United States have literally taken off.110 Such activities include real
estate aerial photography, surface mine mapping, and videography by
businesses as large as Nike, BMW, and Wal-Mart.111 While the Fourth
Amendment, various federal laws, and the Presidential Memorandum
discussed above limit the federal government and its agencies’ remotesensing activities using drones, no such limitations exist for private civilian
actors or commercial entities using drones for remote sensing. The FAA
claims it has authority over all airspace at all altitudes in the United
States112 and over all aircraft, defined as “any contrivance invented, used, or
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”113 But despite that broad authority,
non-commercial hobbyists have been historically ignored by FAA in terms
of following normal aircraft operating rules and regulations as long as they
avoided manned aircraft and airports.114 And related specifically to remote
sensing, the FAA has no legislative authority to promulgate—or even
consider—privacy-related issues.
1. FAA Generally Ignores Private Hobbyist Use of Drones to
Conduct Remote Sensing
Since 1981, the FAA has ignored private operators of model aircraft115
in terms of operating rules or regulations because model aircraft flight
posed little risk to other aircraft or people on the ground. The FAA
provided non-mandatory guidance to modelers in an advisory document,116
which generally advised operators to avoid flying over crowds of people or
otherwise endangering them and to avoid airports and aircraft operations.117
By complying with those guidelines, model aircraft operators avoided

110. See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Drone Ban? Corporations Skirt Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19,
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/drone-ban-corporations-skirt-rules-1424373939.
111. Id.
112. Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 18, 2014).
113. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2012).
114. See Advisory Circular, supra note 59 (providing safety guidelines, not regulations, for
model aircraft operators).
115. Model aircraft are technologically and aerodynamically identical to modern drones in
terms of systems, control, and risk to other aircraft and people on the ground.
116. See Advisory Circular, supra note 59.
117. Id.
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having to comply with the comparatively more complex regulations for
manned aircraft.
A similar scheme exists in the proposed regulations for small
unmanned aircraft in the new FAR part 107. The new regulations would
only apply to non-hobby or non-recreational purposes118 per Section 336 of
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which states “the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not promulgate
any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft being
developed as a model aircraft”119 as long as it meets several criteria, which
are essentially the same requirements in the 1981 advisory circular plus a
maximum weight limit of fifty-five pounds.120 Thus, not only will the FAA
continue to ignore private hobbyist use of drones as long they do not impact
safety or interfere with other aircraft, they are prohibited by statute from
doing so.
2. The FAA Lacks Jurisdiction over Privacy Issues, Including the
Collection, Use, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data
The FAA has no legislative mandate to consider privacy concerns
when determining aircraft operating regulations. Instead, the FAA is tasked
with “assigning and maintaining safety as the highest priority in air
commerce”121 while considering a number of other economic or efficiencytype variables.122 None of the other considerations relate to privacy.
Although the Presidential Memorandum discussed above would include the
FAA as a federal agency and require the Agency to consider privacy issues
and promulgate policy and regulations in accordance with the
Memorandum, the FAA generally is not engaged in use of drones, but
rather in regulating other persons or entities who are. Thus, the
Memorandum directives discussed above do not actually apply to the FAA
itself, unless the Agency starts using drones. And if it did, the
Memorandum only directs internal agency policy and does not grant the
FAA power nor provide direction as to regulations the Agency might
promulgate related to privacy or remote sensing.

118. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45).
119. H.R. Rep. No. 112-381, at 68 (2012).
120. Id. at 63.
121. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2012).
122. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(2)-(16) (2012).
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3. The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”) will Provide Unenforceable
Guidance to Commercial Entities on Policies for the
Collection, Use, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data
Lastly, the Memorandum provides:
Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department
of Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, and in consultation with other
interested agencies, will initiate [a] multi-stakeholder engagement
process to develop a framework regarding privacy, accountability,
and transparency for commercial and private UAS use.123
The NTIA is an executive branch agency tasked with advising the
President on telecommunications and information policy issues.124 Neither
the Memorandum nor NTIA’s statutory powers provide for any regulatory
enforcement process.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND LEGAL
REMEDIES CONCERNING COLLECTION, USE, AND
DISSEMINATION OF REMOTELY SENSED PRIVATE DATA
ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY ABSENT COMPREHENSIVE
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In the context of remote sensing by drone, neither the common law,
federal law, nor administrative regulation individually or together provide
comprehensive protection of remotely sensed private data. The Fourth
Amendment provides some limited protections in the context of
government collection of data, but the Third-Party Doctrine significantly
limits control of remedies for unauthorized use or dissemination of private
data once it has been obtained by a third party. And while persistent,
penetrating, or technologically sophisticated remote sensing by government
or police is subject to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
there are no such constraints on civil or commercial remote sensing
123. See Memorandum, supra note 67, at 3.
124. According to its website:
NTIA is the Executive Branch agency that is principally responsible for advising the
President on telecommunications and information policy issues. NTIA’s programs and
policymaking focus largely on expanding broadband Internet access and adoption in
America, expanding the use of spectrum by all users, and ensuring that the Internet
remains an engine for continued innovation and economic growth.
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. AGENCY, Mission Statement, http://www ntia.doc.gov/?Wz1=VsHx4
Bg0J6b54d2Z.
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activities by drone. A single Presidential Memorandum provides some
procedural guidance to federal agencies for privacy protection in the context
of remote sensing by drone and orders the creation of a multi-stakeholder
framework regarding privacy, accountability, and transparency for
commercial and private UAS use. The availability of high resolution digital
imaging equipment lightweight enough to be mounted on a very small
drone allows any person to spy on another in ways much more intrusive
than listening over the backyard fence, and the law simply does not
adequately contemplate or address the ramifications of that combination.
Because states are federally preempted from promulgating aviation
regulations, a comprehensive federal legislative enactment would be the
most efficient and effective method of limiting both governmental and
commercial gathering, use, and dissemination of remotely sensed data by
drone.

